Ilstrasi (www.karobanews.com) |
Heading into the 2014 election, Indonesian society is being faced
with certain political figures, ranging from businessmen and office
holders, to military background figures. However, given many election
surveys, two prominent figures have emerged as the most likely to be the
next Indonesian president, namely Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto.
Joko Widodo, affectionately known as Jokowi, is Jakarta’s current
governor, whereas Prabowo is the chief patron of the Greatest Indonesian
Movement Party (Gerindra) as well as a former general of the late
President Suharto. Recently, Jokowi has been announced as the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDIP) candidate. Thus, the governor Jokowi and former military general,
Prabowo will likely dominate the Indonesian political landscape prior
to presidential election in September 2014.
After 15 years of democratic consolidation, the big inquiry is
whether Indonesia still needs the military style leadership. In the last
three general elections, the military candidates have always been
involved to run for office. The current president is the former Suharto
general who has been in office for two terms.
In this 2014 election, at least two former generals have announced
their candidacies beside Prabowo, namely former Indonesian military
commander Wiranto supported by his party, the Peoples Conscience Party
(Hanura) and Sutiyoso, retired army lieutenant general cum Chairman of
the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). The ruling party,
Democrat, also is presenting former army chief of staff
Pramono Edhie Wibowo as one of its presidential candidates. All of
these generals, except Pramono Edhie, served during Suharto’s waning
days. And these three generals are also widely believed to have been
involved in human rights violations.
Ironically, on the one hand, Indonesian society is hoping to have clean and good leaders, such as Jokowi and Tri Rismaharini, the Surabaya Mayor.
On the other hand, as a recent survey shows, many Indonesian voters still prefer a presidential or vice presidential candidate
with a military background over a civilian. Three characteristics have
been advanced for this preference, namely decisiveness, discipline and
firmness. This tendency exemplifies the romance of the Suharto-backed
military regime among Indonesians.
The military in Indonesia has two prominent reasons why they have to
meddle in daily political life. First, the Indonesian military (TNI)
still criticizes the current democratic system. As attributed by
Indonesia’s army strategic command head, Lieutenant General Gatot
Nurmayanto, Indonesian democracy is not always right for Indonesia.
Accordingly, democracy based on popular vote does not always lead to the strengthening of the nation.
For some political analysts, this is the picture of a hard-line
faction within the TNI to push for more military involvement in
Indonesia’s daily politics.
Second, the TNI has doubted the ability of civilian government to govern. Corruption and immorality have become chronic diseases
in the civilian government. As a result, certain political regulations
can risk national stabilization, such as the current dispute over the
legitimacy of Law No. 42/2008 on presidential and vice presidential
elections. As former army intelligence
head, Soleman B. Ponto argues, the potential of national chaos is high,
given that the law was dismissed by the constitutional court in January
2014. If national chaos develops, the military will launch what Ponto
calls a “constitutional coup”.
In addition, during my personal interview in 2012 with former Vice
Chief Staff of Army, retired Major General Kiki Syanahkri, he expressed
the same concern. He thought that the quality degradation of civilian
government and intended to take political steps necessary to return to
the original version of the 1945 constitution. To support his idea, Kiki
and his colleges in the Retired Army Association (PPAD), proposed to
form a “national council”. This would allow the military to legitimately
engage directly in politics. These statements raise the question about
the military’s relentless tendency to take any opportunity to influence
or even to take over the civilian government.
Democracy allows for every individual, regardless of their
background, to run for office. However, after the downfall of
authoritarian regime and the beginning of democratic consolidation, the
remnants of a former authoritarian regime, including the military,
should be restricted from participating in politics. The former regime
was highly backed up by the military in Indonesia during the new order
period for over 30 years. This history can give the military the desire
to re-engage in the new political system. If it does, there is high
possibility for the military to bring back an authoritarian spirit, such
as in Egypt and Thailand.
According to the Indonesian constitution, military figures can run
for office after resigning from active duty. However, the close
relations between former officers and active officers are difficult to
overlook. Former officers support the core interests of their
institution. This again brings up the question of the future of the TNI
reformation that has stalled during the second term of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono (SBY). Three crucial areas of the TNI’s internal reform could
be “blocked” by former senior officers if they get elected.
First and foremost is the uplifting of human rights values among
officers. The TNI has been globally known for its human rights record
toward its own people. The military internal reformation failed to deal
with this issue, particularly in Papua province. The military candidates
are likely to defend their former institution. For instance, the prison
raid by army special forces (Kopassus) that killed four detainees in
Cebongan, drew support and even praise from Prabowo and other former
generals, including SBY. In addition, Pramono Edhie Wibowo recently
called to forget past violations of human rights conducted by the TNI.
The second area of army reform which might be left undone is the
reorganization or even liquidation of some army territorial commands
across country. Many territorial commands at the regional level have
been widely alleged to be used for political and economic purposes. As a
leading general during the early days of TNI’s reformation, Wiranto
supported and defended the existence of the commands. In present day,
there are no military candidates have questioned these commands in light
of charges of misuse for political purpose and human rights violations.
The third area of military reform needed is the management of its
businesses, particularly the illegal ones, such as illegal logging,
gambling, and the security business. It seems hard to tackle this issue
if some former generals get elected in September, given the fact that
the military still highly depends on these off-budget resources.
Given the uncertainty at the national level, Indonesian democracy
will arguably allow the military figures to continue their role as
decisive political actors as happened during the new order. In contrast,
after the era of strong military regimes, certain Latin America
countries have produced many strong populist leaders, such as Lula Da
Silva and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in
Argentine and Evo Morales in Bolivia. These figures can restrict
constitutionally military ambition in their countries. They can channel
effectively people’s aspirations to support government policies, instead
of paving the way to the military to get its second opportunity to
govern.
Indonesian politics has never gotten out from under military
influence, and certain populist leaders, such as Jokowi and Risma, also
appear to rely on military support. As a result, the future of the
Indonesian democratic system remains uncertain.
Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi is a visiting
scholar in the Equality Development and Globalization Studies at the
BCICS, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, the US.